ABSTRACT Boolean functions should possess high fast algebraic immunity when used in stream ciphers in order to stand up to fast algebraic attacks. However, in previous research, the fast algebraic immunity of Boolean functions was usually calculated by the computer. In 2017, Tang, Carlet, and Tang first mathematically proved that every function belonging to a class of 1-resilient Boolean functions has the fast algebraic immunity no less than n − 6. Inspired by the Tang's method, we also demonstrate that the fast algebraic immunity of another class of the 1-resilient Boolean functions is no less than n − 6. Meanwhile, we also prove some combinator facts originated from the Tu-Deng Conjecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Boolean functions are the kernel components in some cryptosystems and their cryptographic properties directly determine the security of the cryptosystems. Prior to 2003, the cryptographic properties of Boolean functions were balancedness, high algebraic degree and high nonlinearity when widely used in stream ciphers [1] , [2] .
Algebraic attack has become an important cryptanalysis method for attacking encryption algorithms. Courtois and Meier implemented algebraic attacks in 2003. It was efficient attack for many stream ciphers previously considered secure [3] . In order to oppose standard algebraic attacks, Meier et al. proposed a new Boolean function's cryptographic property named algebraic immunity (AI) [4] . Later in [5] , on the basis of standard algebraic attacks, Courtois proposed the fast algebraic attack (FAA) and used the fast algebraic immunity (FAI) to evaluate the ability of resisting the FAA. FAA is possible when the algebraic degree of nonzero function g is as small as possible and
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Abdallah Kassem. the algebraic degree of nonzero function h does not exceed n/2 such that fg = h [5] - [7] . Optimal AI and high FAI are attributes that Boolean functions should have in order to resist (fast) algebraic attacks. Many efforts have been made to investigate symmetric Boolean functions [8] - [15] , rotation symmetric Boolean functions [16] - [19] , and other Boolean functions [20] - [24] , which possess optimal AI and high FAI. But, as everyone knows, it is very difficult to calculate the FAI of given Boolean function with high algebraic degree when the variable is larger than 18 [25] . Until now, it is still a very difficult task to give a strictly lower bound on the minimum algebraic degree of fg by mathematical proof.
In 2013, Tang et al. proposed two classes of Boolean functions, called T-C-T function, which have excellent cryptographic properties [26] . Regrettably, they are not 1-resilient which represents a disadvantage when they are used as a filter in stream ciphers. In 2017, Tang et al. presented a class of 1-resilient Boolean functions [25] . Most notably, they mathematically proved that the FAI of the class of 1-resilient Boolean function is no less than n − 6, which is the first time to invent a provable high FAI in an infinite class of 1-resilient Boolean functions. Before that, through a slight modification of the T-C-T function, Tang et al. also got another class of 1-resilient Boolean functions where it has extremely good properties widely used in Boolean functions in 2014 [27] . Inspired by Tang's method, we also prove that the FAI of the class of 1-resilient Boolean functions proposed by Tang in [27] is no less than n − 6.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some definitions of Boolean functions. Section III demonstrates some combinator facts originated from Tu-Deng Conjecture and presents a class of Boolean functions which have almost optimal algebraic immunity for the sake of the subsequent proof. Section IV demonstrates that the FAI of a class of 1-resilient Boolean functions doesn't less than n − 6. Finally, we give conclusion of this paper and raise some ideas for future work in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let F n 2 be the n-dimensional vector space over the field F 2 of two elements and F 2 n be the finite field of order 2 n . A Boolean function of n-variable is a mapping from F n 2 into F 2 . Let B n be the set of all n-variable Boolean functions. We can express the Boolean function's truth table as
where α is a primitive element of F 2 n . Let's use supp(f ) = {x ∈ F 2 n |f (x) = 0} to represent the support of f . wt(f ) expresses the Hamming weight of f which is the cardinality of supp(f ). Boolean function f ∈ B n is balanced when wt(f ) = 2 n−1 . When n is even, the n-variable Boolean function can be expressed as
where a i,j ∈ F 2 n/2 are such that
Let x · ω be any inner product in F n 2 , then the Walsh transform of f ∈ B n is defined as
Over F 2 n , the Walsh transform can be expressed as
where tr n 1 (x) = n−1 i=0 x 2 i is a mapping from F 2 n to F 2 . In order to make stream ciphers resist correlation attacks effectively, when cryptographic functions are used as combiners, high-order correlation immunity is required. When used as filters, the first-order correlation immunity is sufficient. In [28] , there is a simple way to judge whether it is a resilient function or not.
Lemma 1 [28] : An n-variable Boolean function f is m-resilient when and only when its Walsh transform fulfills
Even for Boolean functions previously considered secure, algebraic attacks are still a powerful attack [3] . For the purpose to evaluate the ability of resisting standard algebraic attacks, the algebraic immunity which is a new cryptographic property is proposed.
Definition 1 [4] : The algebraic immunity of a Boolean function f ∈ B n , expressed by AI(f ), is defined as AI(f ) = min{deg(f )|fg = 0 or (f + 1)g = 0, g = 0 ∈ B n }.
In order to ensure that Boolean function can resist algebraic attack effectively, it should have as high AI as possible. In [3] , AI(f ) ≤ n 2 is proved for an arbitary n-variable Boolean function f . On the basis of standard algebraic attacks, Courtois proposed the fast algebraic attacks (FAA). When one can get a nonzero function g with low algebraic degree and nonzero function h with algebraic degree less than or equal to n/2 such that fg = h, FAA is possible.
Definition 2 [29] : The fast algebraic immunity of a Boolean function f ∈ B n , expressed by FAI(f ), is defined as
III. A CLASS OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS WITH ALMOST OPTIMAL ALGEBRAIC IMMUNITY
In recent years, with the C-F function as a component, the method using Bivariate Polynomial Representation has obtained more and more excellent constructions. In [26] , Tang et al. put forward two classes of Boolean functions which have excellent cryptographic properties. However, they are not 1-resilient which is a disadvantage when used as a filter in stream ciphers.
Construction 1 [26] : Let n = 2k ≥ 4, α be a primitive element of the finite field F 2 k and s = {s,
where g s is defined on
The n-variable Boolean function b s (x, y) in Construction 1 includes the four cryptographic properties where 0 ≤ s
But in need of subsequent proofs, we need to modify Construction 1 so that we get a class of almost optimal algebraic immunity Boolean functions. In Construction 1, the cardinality of s is 2 k−1 . We will reduce the cardinality of s to get m whose cardinality is 2 k−1 − 2. Construction 2: Let n = 2k ≥ 4, α be a primitive element of the finite field
b m (x, y) ∈ B n can be defined as:
where g m is defined on F 2 k with supp(g m ) = {α j | j ∈ m }. In order to achieve the purpose of proving the AI of Construction 2, we need to demonstrate some combinator facts by modifying Tu-Deng Conjecture [23] . Finally, some new lemmas are obtained.
Lemma 2 [30] :
Proof: Since the shift equivalence, t can be supposed as the following form:
Suppose wt(t) < k − 1 now, and let µ = (k − 1) − wt(t), then
Case 2: µ is odd. Let
Therefore, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ 2 k − 2, there always exists at least one (a, b)
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we know
− 2. Proof: When t = 0, there's a = b, and then 2 wt(a) ≤ k − 2, i.e., wt(a) ≤ (k − 2)/2. VOLUME 7, 2019
≥ 4 for even k ≥ 4. The whole proof is completed. From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we can deduce the following lemma:
Lemma 6:
Proof: We can see from Construction 2 that supp(f ) =
Then, when 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 k − 3, the vector
is a BCH code's codeword whose length is 2 k −2 over F 2 k and designed distance is 2 k−1 − 1. Also, when it has the elements in m , the codeword is zeros. Because of the BCH bound, its Hamming weight is not less than 2 k−1 −1 when the codeword is nonzero. But, from Lemma 6, its Hamming weight should be no exceed 2 k−1 − 2. Therefore, the codeword have to be zero, i.e.,
is an annihilator of f + 1 with deg(h) < k − 1. Alike,
is also a BCH code's codeword whose length is 2 k − 2 over F 2 k and designed distance is 2 k−1 + 2. Also when it has the elements in F * 2 k \ m , the codeword is zeros. From definition of the BCH bound, we can see that its Hamming weight is at least 2 k−1 +2 when the codeword is nonzero. From Lemma 6, we can infer that its Hamming weight is at most 2 k−1 − 2, which is a contradiction. Thus, we get h = 0.
From the discussion above, the minimum algebraic degree of annihilators of f and f +1 is no less than k −1. So, AI(f ) = k − 1.
IV. A LOWER BOUND OF FAST ALGEBRAIC IMMUNITY OF A CLASS OF 1-RESILIENT BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
By modifying Construction 1 slightly, Tang et al. got a class of 1-resilient Boolean functions where it has extremely good properties widely used in Boolean functions in [27] . [27] Let n = 2k ≥ 10, α be a primitive element of the finite field
Construction 3:
where b s (x, y) ∈ B n belongs to (1) and supp(u s ) includes the following three parts:
In other words, supp(f s ) includes the following four parts: [27] Let n = 2k, f s be the n-variable Boolean function in Construction 3. Then algebraic immunity of Boolean function f s is k, i.e., AI(f s ) = k.
Then We will give a lower bound about the FAI of Construction 3. Meanwhile, we require the following two lemmas.
Lemma 7: Let n = 2k ≥ 10, α be a primitive element of the finite filed
First, it follows from Theorem 1 that b m ∈ B n has algebraic immunity k − 1 when 0 < m < 2 k − 2 where b m (x, y) = g m (xy) ∈ F 2 n is the function defined by (2) . We can know b m has nonzero annihilator whose algebraic degree is no less than k − 1. Second, it is easy to see that g is a nonzero annihilator of b m in Construction 2 with m = s + 2 k−1 − 2. Therefore, deg(g) ≥ k − 1. The whole proof is completed.
Lemma 8: Let n = 2k ≥ 10, α be a primitive element of the finite filed
Proof: It is easy to see that
In the same way, we also have α 2 k −s ab ∈ F 2 k \{0, 1}. Thus, for proving there are
Note that tr k 1 (z) = 0 if z ∈ U , and tr k 1 (z) = 1 if z ∈ F * 2 k \U . According to the above two equations, we can know z∈U (−1)
, there are two situations we need to consider: 1) tr k 1 (λz ) = 1 and tr k 1 (µr ) = 0. 2) tr k 1 (λz ) = 0 and tr k 1 (µr ) = 1. So there are 2(2 k−2 (2 k−2 − 1)) different element pair (z , r ) ∈ U such that tr k 1 (λz + µr ) = 1. The whole proof is completed.
Theorem 3: Let n = 2k > 10, 0 ≤ s < 2 k−1 − 1, then the FAI of f s in Construction 3 is at least n − 6.
Proof: In order to prove that FAI of f s is at least n − 6 when 0 ≤ s < 2 k−1 − 1, we should demonstrate that deg(g) + deg(f s g) ≥ n − 6 with g ∈ B n and 1 ≤ deg(g) < k. We use counter-evidence to prove this conclusion. Assume that deg(g) + deg(f s g) ≤ n − 7 when there have a Boolean function g with 1 ≤ deg(g) < k. Afterwards, by (3) we get
where
There are two situations we need to consider. The first case:
Then by Lemma 7, we get deg(g) ≥ k − 1. We can know that deg(f s g) ≥ k since f s g is a nonzero annihilator of f s + 1 and f s + 1 has nonzero annihilator whose algebraic degree is no less than k by Theorem 2. So, in this situation we have FAI(f s ) ≥ n − 1 which contradicts our assumption FAI(f s ) ≤ n − 7.
The second case: supp(g) T s . Then there must exist an
We can know gg is nonzero and deg(gg ) ≤ deg(g) + 2. Let's multiply g on both sides of (4) we get
because g is a nonzero annihilator of u s . Therefore, we get deg(gg )+deg(f s gg ) = deg(gg )+deg(b s gg ) ≤ FAI(f s )+4 ≤ n − 3. From above we know there is a nonzero function gg where deg(gg ) < k + 2 such that deg(gg ) + deg(b s gg ) ≤ n − 3. When deg(ff ) < k, it is contradictory to 4) in Proposition 1; When k ≤ deg(gg ) < k +2, it is contradictory to deg(gg ) + deg(b s gg ) ≥ n.
Therefore, It is impossible to assume that FAI(f s ) ≤ n − 7. So we have FAI(f s ) ≥ n − 6. The whole proof is completed.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates that a class of 1-resilient Boolean functions has FAI greater than or equal to n − 6. In order to prove the AI of the class of Boolean functions, we prove some combinator facts derived from Tu-Deng Conjecture. By means of this method, we can also prove that some other 1-resilient functions have the same lower bound of fast algebraic immunity. However, there is still a distance between the lower bound and the actual value of fast algebraic immunity. If we can find Boolean function g (x, y) with more lower algebraic degree, we can improve the lower bound of fast algebraic immunity. This will be the direction we plan to study in the future. 
